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Abstract: The aim of this article is to discuss the position of common values in the 
domain of EU external relations. The article looks at the role of common values in defining 
the EU’s identity in its external policies and uses the European Neighbourhood Policy as an 
example. It is argued that the notion ‘common values’ is used by the EU institutions as both a 
‘universal’ and an ‘EU’ concept, which highlights their abstract nature. Such abstraction is 
also reflected in the way in which Russia has recently aimed at developing its own set of 
’common values’ to be adopted by the neighbour countries. It is concluded that the ENP does 
not promote jointly shared common values to be adopted by neighbour countries. Instead, it 
employs a conditionality policy to ensure that the EU’s own understanding of the meaning of 
its values are adopted by neighbour countries. 
 
1) Common values as a contemporary legal and political category in the EU  
 
Since the early 1990’s, the EU has increasingly identified itself with the values that 
are perceived as laying the foundation of modern civilisation and culture.
1
 EU institutions are 
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referring more and more frequently to ”common values” in their recent legal and declarative 
documents. After becoming the largest customs union in the world with a combined 
population about 500 million, - and with the largest voting power in many multilateral 
institutions - the EU is now seeking to acquire the role of a global player. In this setting, 
common values are being used in order to enhance the EU’s own credibility as a global 
player: the EU wishes increasingly to be profiled as a ”messenger of good values”.2  
Currently, the EU founding treaties do not provide any legal definition of the values 
the EU is invoking. These values receive their most definitive form in the draft Reform 
Treaty to be signed in December 2007, wherein it is emphasised that common values, which 
are largely identical to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, constitute the foundation 
of the EU:  
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 3 
 The draft Reform Treaty defines the Union’s common values as principles of legal and 
political nature. On the one hand, common values emphaises the nature of the EU as a truly 
political union. On the other hand, the implementation of these values is bound to certain 
legal consequences, and both existing and new Member States should respect such values.  
This external promotion mission is closely linked to the claimed universality of these 
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values:
4
 Since the EU’s ‘common values’ are in fact universal, it follows that they belong to 
all. Following this vision, the universality of Europe’s own values has justified making both 
trade and development aid conditional on third countries’ ability to implement them.5 At the 
same time, however, common values are believed to be characteristic of the EU and, 
ultimately, lay down its borders.  
This dual role allocated to common values reflects the philosophy behind European 
values: on the one hand, the historical heritage of Europe; on the other, universal. The 
problem with this vision is this: if the EU’s ‘common values’ are universal and as such 
belong equally to everyone, it is indeed difficult for the EU to base its own identity on them 
and, at the same time, use the concept of identity as something that should draw a line 
between ‘us’ and ‘the others’. If ‘we’ is defined by reference to clear and unambiguous 
‘good’ values, then ‘they’ are relegated into a vehicle of antivalues or ‘bad’ values. 
Therefore, the clearer the value-connection of the EU’s identity, the sharper is the dichotomy 
between the EU and that which is outside it.
6
 Alternatively, the EU’s identity can be 
explained in expansionist terms and thus the EU becomes the defender of values that are 
shared by all. In short, though the values are indeed universal, Europe received them first.
7
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The confidence with which the EU today speaks of its own common values is, of course, not 
without connection to the global political transformations of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
- it is clearly less risky to speak about the ‘universal’ when there are few competing models.8 
Today, the discourse of human rights provides social and governmental practices with an 
unprecedented degree of political legitimacy, especially in the West. That legitimacy cannot 
be dissociated from the claim of universality, or objectivity, made by human rights defenders. 
Such values, as established by international human rights instruments, tend to be presented as 
neutral and free from political confrontation. Rights are not only believed to be ‘universal’, 
they are also believed to have automatic consequences that all parties agree on.
9
 For the EU, 
this understanding of the meaning of values has, especially in its external relations, made the 
need for debate seem unnecessary. 
Since the early 1990’s, EU membership has become a significant instrument in 
promoting economic, political and legal change and good neighbourly behaviour.
10
 After the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU, much focus has been placed on the development of a 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which applies to the EU’s 15 immediate neighbours 
with the exception of Russia.
11
 The ENP is largely modelled on the earlier enlargement 
process applied in the context of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. However, the political 
atmosphere in the EU has changed since then and further enlargement is off the table. The 
ENP does not offer EU membership for the neighbour countries but does not ultimately 
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exclude it as a possibility.
12
 In practice, however, EU actions under the ENP display a clear 
reluctance to go any further than mere political and economic rapprochement. Thus, the ENP 
forms a transitional policy leading to an enhanced level of cooperation but not membership. 
Like most other EU external policies, the ENP policy includes a strong value dimension:  
The European Neighbourhood Policy's vision involves a ring of countries, 
sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an 
increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a 
significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring 
enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and 
well being.
13
 
In this paper, first, we will focus on the position of the EU’s common values in the 
ENP context by, first, exploring the question relating to the role of common values in 
defining the EU’s identity. By common values we understand principles of legal and political 
nature which are claimed to lay down a foundation of the contemporary Europe’s identity 
and, therefore, legitimise the future evolution of the EU as a regional political and economic 
center based on universally respected values. It is argued that the same values can be both 
’shared’ or ‘universal’ and the ‘EU’s’ only if they are in fact abstract in nature. This 
abstraction has various effects on the implementation of values in the context of particular 
EU external policies. For example, the open-ended nature of these unspecified values also 
makes it possible to use the same argumentation both for inclusive and for exclusive 
purposes, as has been the case in the debate over EU borders. 
Second, this paper will look into how the claim of the EU’s own but largely undefined 
‘common values’ functions in a policy based, on the one hand, on conditionality but which, 
on the other, provides  no clearly determined advantage for the third parties on which the 
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conditionality is imposed in the first place, as in the case of the ENP. It will be argued that 
the abstraction of ‘shared values’ results in a situation in which the ENP formally promotes 
jointly shared values but which,  in practice, amount to the EU’s own reading of them. This is 
largely due to the lack of any appropriate legal and institutional mechanism for fostering a 
genuine debate on the meaning common values between the EU and ENP countries. In the 
end, this policy could lead to an imbalance between the parties and and, ultimately, the failure 
of the ENP itself. 
 
2) Development of a European identity 
One of the earliest attempts within the European Economic Community (EEC) to give a 
definition for ‘Europe’ took place in the December 1973 Declaration on European Identity.14 
At that time, it was considered that Europe’s unity was based on the “cherished values of 
their legal, political and moral order” and the “same attitudes to life”. As a result, the 
Member States were 
determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of 
law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of 
respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European 
identity.
15
  
Simultaneously, a simple characterisation of this identity in relation to the rest of the world 
was attempted (after all, the point of identity is to be something that the others are not):  
The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine – who share 
values and aspirations based on a common heritage – are mutually beneficial 
and must be preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determination of the 
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Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity.
16
 
The common values of Europe were seen as characteristic of Western Europe as opposed to 
Central and Eastern Europe. They were not the sole property of the EC, however, but shared 
with the Western world, especially with the United States. However, during the Cold War, it 
was not only the EEC that cherished the idea of “Europe”. As Balibar has shown, especially 
after 1945, both of the competing blocs “laid exclusive claim on the idea of Europe in its 
confrontation with the other”; just like the West, Soviet communism claimed to be “the 
representative of the European idea, the bearer of its heritage and future”.17 And neither was 
rights rhetoric in any way alien to the Soviet block, which had its own interpretation of the 
meaning and purpose of rights.
18
 In short, the discourse on values has always had a political 
dimension.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many things changed. For the EEC, this meant 
adopting a new understanding of the borders of ‘Europe’. In 1993, the Copenhagen European 
Council declared that “the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire 
shall become members of the European Union” as soon as these countries were “able to 
assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions 
required”.19 The project of enlarging eastwards amounted to the fifth enlargement of the 
EEC/EU, but it was unique in many ways. It was the first time that the question concerning 
the identity of Europe clearly became an issue: whether Europe meant those countries already 
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in the EU, or perhaps Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
20 
No previous enlargement had 
focused on so many different countries that were so dramatically removed from the EU in 
political and economic terms.
21 Nonetheless, integration with Central and Eastern Europe 
countries was strongly justified on the grounds that these countries were indeed ‘one of us’. 
Smith describes how  
the ‘European identity’ of the Eastern European states could not be disputed, 
especially as they implemented political and economic reforms along Western 
lines. The option of actually denying membership to the East European 
countries was never considered seriously in the Community.
22
 
But there was also a problem: after fifty years of Communism, the Central and Eastern 
European countries were in many ways different from the “old” EEC/EU Member States. 
Many of the qualities that were seen as characteristic of a “European” state were absent, such 
as independent media, a fully functioning judiciary and a sufficient level of protection  of 
human rights in general. However, if the countries of the former Eastern Block were regarded 
as ‘European’ and thus fulfilled the most fundamental membership criterion, there was 
ultimately no valid reason to keep them outside the EU, especially when these states soon 
expressed their wish to be included.
23
 As Cremona has demonstrated, the Copenhagen 
declaration (1993) developed a perception of the EU as the key-player in the “re-unification 
or re-creation of Europe” and that the “European Union could, and even should, be open to 
the inclusion of the whole of Europe”.24 This was because the EEC/EU had  
                                                 
20
 Vitzthum, ‘Die Identität Europas’, (2002) 1 Europarecht 27. On the limits of ‘Europe’, see also Fritz, ‘New 
Divisions in Europe? East-Eastern Divergence and the Case of Ukraine’, EUI Working Papers RSC 2000/63. 
21
 Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in Light of Their Pre-Accession Reorientation’, (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 1173, 1176. 
22
 K. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy – The Case of Eastern Europe (St. Martin’s Press, 1999) 108. 
23
 Hungary and Poland (applied in March and April 1994) were followed in 1995 by other East and Central 
European countries: Romania, Slovakia, Latvia and Estonia (June, October and November 1995), Lithuania and 
Bulgaria (December 1995), the Czech Republic and Slovenia (January and June 1996).  
24
 Cremona, ‘Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria’, in W. 
Czaplinski (ed.), Poland’s Way to the European Union: Legal Aspects, (Polish Yearbook of International Law, 
2002). 
 9 
never been a closed club, and cannot now refuse the historical challenge to 
assume its continental responsibilities and contribute to the development of a 
political and economic order for the whole of Europe.
25
  
The key question for defining Europe’s identity and subsequently its borders was: what 
is Europe? The requirement that the Member States are ’European’ was included in the EU 
founding treaties from the very beginning. It occupies a “fundamental place in the body of 
accession principles”,26 even if what was actually meant by ‘European’ was intentionally left 
ambiguous. In 1992 it was, in the Commission’s view that it was “neither possible nor 
opportune” to establish the frontiers of the future EU: 
It combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute 
to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values and 
historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject 
to review by each succeeding generation.
27
 
The 1990’s idea was to bring together the peoples that shared the same mythical construction 
of Europe in terms of ‘common values’, a ‘common heritage and culture’, even including a 
‘common destiny’.28 Thus, when the old geographical division between the East and the West 
became outdated, the values that the both sides of Europe were believed to share made an 
appearance. 
From its very beginning European integration has been firmly rooted in a 
shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions 
and the rule of law. These common values have proved necessary for securing 
peace and developing prosperity in the European Union. They will also serve as 
a cornerstone for the enlarging Union.
29
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In practice, the EU’s common values were allocated a role in controlling the 
enlargement of the EU and their unconditional acceptance served as a precondition for EU 
membership for all applicant states.
30
 But in this context the vagueness of the language used 
to refer human rights soon made itself visible: since numerous human rights related problems 
existed, the strict implementation of the human rights criteria would not enable the 
‘unification of Europe’but would ultimately lead to exclusion. In other words, the criteria 
would. This was problematic, because the promise of membership had already been given. 
Thus, flexibility in the application of the criteria was needed. This meant that in the end, 
arguments about common values did not really play a decisive role in the process; instead, 
they were simply one of the aspects to be adjusted to the greater objective of enabling 
enlargement, showing how the “principle of a Union open to European states”31 was 
fundamentally incompatible with the idea of making enlargement conditional on the strict 
fulfilment of certain well-defined criteria. The 2004 enlargement was celebrated in the 
declaration on “One Europe” by the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, 
jointly signed by the old and future EU Member States: 
Today is a great moment for Europe. […] Our common wish is to make Europe 
a continent of democracy, freedom, peace and progress. The Union will remain 
determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and 
prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union. […] Our aim is one 
Europe.
32
 
But does this mean that the borders of ‘Europe’ are now definitively drawn? The way in 
which values have laid down borders reminds us of the very emptiness of such values. During 
the cold war, and in 1993, it was values that were used to define Europe’s borders: the same 
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values both closed and opened up Europe. Today, values are again assigned the same role in 
the context of the ENP. The recent Berlin Declaration celebrates how “[w]ith European 
unification a dream of earlier generations has become a reality”,33 since the division of 
Europe has now been brought to an end with the unification of Europe. But today behind 
Europe’s new borders new dreams are being dreamed. However, the Commission reminds us 
that  
any decision on further EU expansion awaits a debate on the ultimate 
geographic limits of the Union. […] A response to the practical issues posed 
by proximity and neighbourhood should be seen as separate from the question 
of EU accession.
34
 
For the time being, Europe’s door remains closed. This is a reflection of how in fact in the 
new political setting that is ‘unified Europe’ in fact a “great trial of truth” is on-going: 
“now or never is the moment for the dream to materialize, for Europe to rise 
up, renewed or revitalized. This is also the moment when the dream risks 
being smashed into pieces.”35 
However, as far as ’common values’ are concerned the real issue can be explained thus: 
values as such are empty and therefore give little guidance in drawing the boundaries of 
’Europe’. Instead, values receive their meaning in political balancing, which keeps the 
definition of ‘Europe’ open to change over time.  
 
3) Towards a European Neighbourhood Policy  
Prior to the emergence of the ENP the EU neighbour countries enjoyed asymmetrical 
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relations with the EU ranging from association agreements to partnership and cooperation 
agreements.
36
 The former USSR republics had been kept in the “waiting room” by 
encouraging them to accelerate their democratic, political and economic reforms in order to 
upgrade from the “entry-level” Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) to a new and 
enhanced level of partnership with a possibility of full membership in the distant future.
37
 
The PCAs have exhausted their potential of “entry-level” agreement for most of the PCA 
countries. Some of the PCA countries have joined the WTO and have since been recognized 
as market economy countries, but a minority of the PCA countries remains outside active 
partnership with the EU due to their failure to pursue the required internal political and 
economic reforms. Those PCA countries which fulfilled major but not all PCA conditions 
have asked the EU to revisit the framework of the PCAs and to initiate dialogue on a new and 
much more enhanced level of cooperation with a real prospect of obtaining EU membership. 
In response to growing demand to reconsider the different external policies towards 
the neighbour countries, the European Commission initiated in 2003 the “Wider Europe-
Neighbourhood” policy towards third countries which share an immediate post-enlargement 
border with the EU.
38
 The ENP was launched as an “umbrella” policy with a strong degree of 
differentiation and covering a ‘ring of [immediate] neighbours’ including the Southern 
Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia 
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and the Palestinian Authority) and “Western” PCA countries (Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova). Nevertheless, from the very beginning the ENP has proven itself to be a dynamic 
EU external policy without clear geographical limits. Due to the extremely important energy 
and security value of the Caucasus region, the ENP has been expanded to Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan,
39
 while two major immediate EU neighbours, the Russian Federation and 
Belarus, are currently excluded from the scope of the ENP.
40
  
The underlining ENP objective is to open up certain sectors of the EC internal market 
for the ENP countries and to enhance political dialogue between the parties in return for 
substantive political, economic, and legal reforms and the implementation of shared or 
common values.
41
 The objectives of the ENP are to be met through the implementation of a 
set of priorities in tailor-made jointly-agreed Action Plans within the key areas of political 
dialogue, economic reform, trade, and cooperation within justice and home affairs. All Action 
Plans emphasise the need for the neighbour countries to adhere to shared/common values as a 
precondition for further enhancement of bilateral relations with the EU. The Action Plans 
illustrate in greater detail the way ahead over the next three to five years. The next stage of 
the ENP offers a new privileged partnership in the form of European Neighbourhood 
Agreements to replace the present generation of bilateral agreements when the Action Plan 
priorities are met.
42
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Quite crucially, the ENP does not offer a substantively new institutional framework 
for effective bilateral cooperation between the EU and the neighbour countries. Instead, the 
ENP is based on already existing contractual relations between the parties (Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) and PCAs). Institutional arrangements 
within the EMAAs and PCAs are not of equal value. EMAAs (concluded with all countries 
from the Barcelona Process with the current exception of Syria) envisage the functioning of 
the Association Council and the Association Committee, which are authorised to issue 
binding decisions pertaining to the functioning of the agreement. The institutional framework 
of the PCAs comprise the Cooperation Council and Parliamentary Committee, which can 
issue only non-binding recommendations. Therefore, while decisions adopted by the EMAAs 
Association Councils may constitute part of the EC legal order,
43
 recommendations issued by 
the PCAs Cooperation Councils do not. Furthermore, neither EMAAs nor PCAs provide 
informal level of consultations between the EU and the neighbour countries experts in 
comparison to those envisaged with the EU’s other neighbours who benefit from more 
developed relationships under the EEA Agreement,44 the EC-Swiss sectoral agreements and 
decisions adopted within the framework of the EC-Turkey Customs Union.
45
  
It is argued that despite the claim of “sharing common values” between the EU and 
the neighbour countries, the ENP, in fact, provide them quite limited opportunities to engage 
into an equal or almost equal dialogue for the purpose of developing these values through 
informal mutual consultations. In the context of ENP, the EU institutions justify the failure to 
set up a platform for mutual cooperation on the ground that the objectives are shared by the 
parties and effectively promoted by the ENP: 
                                                 
43
 For example, Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, [1987] ECR 3719. 
44
 Art 99(1) EEA Agreement provides: ‘[the Commission] shall informally (emphasis added) seek advice from 
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proposals’. 
45
 See eg Decision 1/95 EC-Turkey Association Council (OJ 1996 L 35/1), Decision 1/96 EC-Turkey Customs 
Cooperation Committee (OJ 1996 L 200/14), Decision 2/97 EC-Turkey Association Council (OJ 1997 L 191/1). 
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The ENP is an offer made by the EU to its partners to which they have 
responded with considerable interest and engagement. Joint ownership of the 
process, based on the awareness of shared values and common interests, is 
essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its 
partners.
46
  
“Joint ownership” forms one of the key characteristics of the ENP: the idea is that the 
parties elaborate the framework of their cooperation through jointly agreed Action Plans. The 
idea of conditionality within the ENP is formally rejected:  
The Action Plans depend, for their success, on the clear recognition of mutual 
interests in addressing a set of priority issues. There can be no question of 
asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be 
defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country.
47
 
The ENP provides that relations between the EU and the neighbour countries  
will build on mutual commitment to common values [emphasis added] 
principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect 
for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good 
neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable 
development.
48
  
However, other elements have also been added to the list of commitments for the 
neighbours with a more distant relationship to the allegedly shared ‘values’: 
Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects of the EU’s 
external action, including, in particular, the fight against terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by 
international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution.
49
  
The extent of shared/common values within the APs extends beyond the values 
referred to above, which are almost identical to the common values listed in the EU Treaty by 
                                                 
46
 European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (COM(2004) 373 final) 8. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid.  
49
 Ibid. 
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making reference to democratic norms and standards developed by other international and 
regional institutions (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, ILO).
50
  
It is argued here that the ENP belongs to a new generation of EU external policies 
which, despite their rhetorical reference to ‘shared values’, in actual fact pursue the objective 
of promoting and protecting the EU’s own values. In fact, neither the EU development 
agreements (Cotonou), nor the Barcelona Declaration, nor the partnership and cooperation 
agreements acknowledge so explicitly the objective of exporting the EU’s common values. In 
the context of the ENP, the EU institutions acknowledge that common or shared values 
should be understood as the “the EU's fundamental values and objectives”.51 In other words, 
common values in the context of the ENP do not, in practice, mean jointly shared values 
between the neighbour country and the EU Member States but, rather that, the EU’s own 
fundamental values and objectives enshrined in the EU founding treaties and reflected in the 
ENP Strategy Paper, should be adopted by the neighbour country. In the context of the ENP 
Action Plans, it is recognised that while the values of  
democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law 
and core labour standards are all essential prerequisites for political stability, 
as well as for peaceful and sustained social and economic development
52
  
and that they are effectively shared between the parties, the neighbouring countries still have 
much to learn: nearly all of them have “a history of autocratic and non-democratic 
governance and poor records in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual”.53 
                                                 
50
 For example, the EU-Ukraine AP states that “Ukraine will continue its internal reforms based on 
strengthening democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, the principle of separation of powers and 
judicial independence, democratic election in accordance with OSCE and Council of Europe norms and 
standards”. Furthermore, the EU-Ukraine AP envisages: the “effective implementation of the European Court of 
Human Rights judgements” by Ukraine; participation in the specific UN and Council of Europe initiatives 
(Group of States against Corruption).  
51
 Ibid.  
52
 Сommunication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’. (COM(2003) 
104 final) 5. 
53
 Ibid. 
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Thus the ENP countries are to follow the EU’s example. In the words of the EU institutions, 
the ENP is “a priority of the EU’s external relations which seeks to harness the attraction and 
influence of Europe, with strong emphasis on institution building and reform”.54 However, it 
is clear that the obligation of reform is not mutual but only involves one of the parties: the 
neighbour countries are expected to change their political, legal and economic heritage in line 
with the EU’s common values.  
Consequently, it is argued that the notion of common values in the ENP is, in fact, 
underpinned by strong conditionality. It is explicitly stated that “the level of ambition of the 
EU’s relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values 
[emphasis added] are effectively shared”.55 Any progress in relations between the EU and a 
neighbour country is conditional on “degree of commitment to common values, as well as 
[…the] will and capacity [of the neighbour country] to implement agreed priorities”. In 
addition, the ENP pursues the policy of differentiation, which again, is based on the 
successful implementation of the EU’s common values by the neighbour countries: 
The ambition and the pace of development of the EU’s relationship with each 
partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as 
well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities.
56
 
In practice, the policy of differentiation is executed through the bilateral APs which highlight 
the programme for reforms for each neighbour country – something that for some neighbour 
countries has been difficult to accept.
57
 Every Action Plan contains “specific actions which 
confirm or reinforce adherence to share values”. Conditionality is visible through country 
reports and monitoring procedures directed at the way in which the ENP countries implement 
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 European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper (COM(2004) 373 final). 
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 For example, for the “pro-European” PCA countries, the ENP resulted in placing their EU relations behind 
certain Mediterranean countries, which have signed association agreements of their own and moved closer to the 
establishment of a free trade area with the EU. Some “pro- European” neighbour countries have realised that 
their participation in the ENP requires much more political and economic involvement in order to upgrade their 
relations with the EU than was required of them in the “pre-ENP” period. 
 18 
“EU fundamental values”. The country reports, modelled on the accession country reports, 
enable the Commission to scrutinize the progress made by the neighbour countries in 
achieving the objectives of their individual AP.
58
 During the comparatively short history of 
the ENP, these reports testify to the fact that the neighbour countries have achieved 
considerable successes in implementing the EU’s common values.59 There is little doubt that 
the application of the conditionality policy has played quite an important role in achieving 
these results. Nevertheless, the Commission has also been eager to highlight areas in which 
the neighbour countries are required to accelerate the pace of their reforms. 
60
  
It must be admitted that the ENP provides an excellent playing field for the promotion 
of the EU’s common values to third countries. Several factors favour such a proposition. First 
and foremost, despite the publicly proclaimed joint ownership of the ENP by the EU and the 
neighbour countries, the ENP remains a policy of an asymmetrical nature which imposes 
unequal mutual commitments on both parties. Unlike the previous enlargement process of the 
EU eastwards, the ENP does not envisage the possibility of full or even associate EU 
membership for neighbour countries in return for their fulfilling the objectives of the ENP 
and adopting the EU’s common values. Nevertheless, the neighbour countries are required to 
implement a significant portion of the acquis communautaire and to launch ambitious 
political, legal and economic reforms under a “pre-accession” type monitoring process 
carried out by EU institutions. In other words, the ENP offers the neighbour countries several 
                                                 
58
 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament ‘On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy: Overall 
Assessment’ (COM(2006) 726 final). 
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 For instance, in case of Ukraine the Commission acknowledged that parliamentary elections in March 2006 
and September 2007 had been conducted in free and democratic manner, and considerable progress had been 
made towards consolidating respect for human rights and the rule of law. The Commission praised Ukrainian, 
Moldovan, and Jordan achievements in the fight against corruption and judiciary reform and progress in 
economic and social reforms in Tunisia. The Morocco Country Report stated that Morocco has implemented 
important reforms in most of the main areas of the Action Plan (liberalization of the audiovisual sector, lifting 
reservations to some human rights international conventions, financial sector, transport, and environment).  
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 In the case of Moldova “the implementation of reforms needs to be given greater attention, including areas 
which have shown good legislative progress”. In the case of Tunisia the Commission underlined “slow progress 
on freedom of association and expression and on implementing the programme for modernizing the justice 
system”. 
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relatively undefined “carrots”: a stake in the EC internal market; an upgrade in political 
cooperation; the provision for additional financial assistance through the new Neighbourhood 
Financial Instrument. Furthermore, the ENP, as it is promoted by the EU, is an external 
policy of a temporary nature. The neighbourhood countries that successfully adopt the EU’s 
common values and the other AP objectives are promised the opportunity to access an 
enhanced (though yet undefined) level of relations: the provision of a new enhanced 
agreement, a free trade area, or perhaps a visa facilitation regime. 
Second, most of the neighbourhood countries enjoy traditionally close historical, legal 
and trade links with most of the EU Member States. For example, the legal systems of the 
neighbour countries stem from the same legal tradition as those of continental EU Member 
States. Most of the neighbour countries participating in the ENP have chosen to accept and to 
implement general legal principles and specific model laws (ie civil law codes, company 
laws, contract laws) in force in those EU Member States which share Roman legal traditions 
(ie France, Germany, the Netherlands). However, this does not mean that the legal systems of 
the neighbour countries replicate the legal systems of the EU Member States but simply that 
national courts in the neighbour countries are more likely to apply general principles of law 
originating from the EU Member States than from countries with other legal traditions. 
Third, common values represent an incentive for further legal, political and economic 
reforms: Political elites in the neighbour countries can refer to the “shared values” enshrined 
in the AP as objectives and benchmarks for further internal legal, political and economic 
reforms in the neighbour countries. In fact, many of the ENP countries have made 
considerable progress in democratic and market reforms as a result of influence and political 
pressure from European organizations. For example, since gaining independence in 1991, 
Ukraine, with little previous experience of the Western understanding of the right to freedom 
and the right to personal integrity, the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment or right 
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to privacy, has achieved significant success in adopting European standards of civil and 
political rights. 
61
 International actors have initiated various programmes of technical 
assistance offering educational and information training for judges and lawyers. These 
programs became a priority for the main donors acting in Ukraine at that time. The 
coordination of their different positions and fields became an opportunity for real change.
62
 
However, these advances are more related to the efforts of the Council of Europe than the 
EU. Still, these examples show how external actors can effectively contribute to the 
development of domestic discussions by providing incentives for change within the country’s 
own political system. While the term of conditionality included in a trade agreement may, at 
the most, serve as a starting point for the implementation of change, its main objective should 
be to launch a political discussion within a third country itself. Human rights argumentation 
serves its most powerful function when it serves its original purpose as a language for 
change: in opposition to something as a part of a largely emancipatory, or critical, enterprise 
so as to enable political contestation of powerful institutions or actions. However, this is a 
discussion which needs to be addressed primarily within third countries themselves. Indeed, 
as Allot has argued, ”meaningful and lasting changes can only come from within”.63 If this is 
forgotten, the application of common values conditionality may also cause certain 
                                                 
61
 The “first wave of reforms” focused on alignment in the Ukrainian Civil Code, Civil and Criminal Procedure 
Codes, information legislation, election laws, the legislation on associations of citizens with the highest 
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Quarterly 155, 169. 
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disadvantages for third countries. 
 
4) Problems linked to the use of common values as a reference for external policies 
Most of the neighbour countries are transition countries, which are undergoing the 
process of transformation from either colonial or Soviet style legal, political and economic 
traditions to Western standards of liberal democracy. The EU’s common values are believed 
to provide an appropriate and credible model framework for domestic reforms. Market 
reforms form the core of the EU agenda – after all, the agreements forming the core of the 
ENP are in their essence trade and cooperation agreements. In this setting, the language of 
common values is used to justify the market reforms: it connects the EU objectives to much 
greater goals, thus giving these reforms “an aura of authority and legitimacy” and suggesting 
that they actually provide protection against abuse by those in powerful positions.
64
 The 
Western reform agenda evidences the alliance between democracy and market economies; 
while the market is supposed to enhance freedom and autonomy, the markets are also said to 
present the essence of democracy. But, at the same time, individuals and countries are 
expected to adapt and subordinate their desires to the demands of a market economy, making 
their options highly restricted and coercive:  
The result is a curious movement between apparently incompatible propositions: 
homage to equality and democracy and neutrality regarding social, cultural and 
political priorities coexist alongside vehement declarations of the utter necessity 
of some of the most radical and potentially transformative aspects of the 
agenda.
65
 
Like with the Central and Eastern European candidate countries nearly 20 years before, the 
EU approach to the neighbour countries largely reflects an idealized and artificial vision of 
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Western market economy,
66
 in which the EU represents the most advanced instantiation of 
the liberal democratic model. The neighbours, on the other hand, are placed under an 
obligation to ‘democratise’ following an agenda set by the EU before they can be considered 
for true participation.
67
 Consequently, the internationalisation of democratic rhetoric 
accompanies a domestic displacement of democratic policies, as “politics is treated as having 
somehow already happened elsewhere”68 - in practice in the deliberations of the European 
Commission. In many ways, the ENP replicates the arrangements surrounding the previous 
enlargement, representing “the worst of both worlds”, causing the neighbours to lose a level 
of independence at a crucial time in their democratic reform and economic restructuring 
programmes,69 while they receive even fewer tangible benefits in return than the applicant 
countries did before them. 
However, the main problem with conditionality being attached to common values in the 
context of the ENP derives from their level of abstraction. To some extent, it is most certainly 
appropriate to talk about the idea of these values as something commonly shared. But, for 
‘common values’ to be both nation-specific and common to all countries at the same time, 
they necessarily need to be very general and allow for local adjustments and exceptions. It 
thus appears that ‘common values’ rely on the great degree of abstraction at which they are 
articulated in national constitutions or legislations or indeed in the resolutions and reports of 
international organizations. While values might indeed be shared at some abstract level, they 
allow for many different readings even among the EU’s own Member States.70 
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 The same point was demonstrated by the European Court on Human Rights in its discussion of the conception 
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This suggests that while most Europeans embrace the idea of certain shared/common 
values at some abstract level, and even agree on the enumeration of a number of civil, 
political, economic and social rights, they often completely disagree on what such values 
might mean in at policy level, i.e. in terms of how they should be implemented. This is 
reflected in the discussions on the meaning of values that frequently surface in and among the 
EU Member States. Most recently, this has been reflected in the refusal of two EU Member 
States to sign up to a binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the context of the Reform 
Treaty, limiting its applicability in relation to their national authorities.
71
 Such ambiguity and 
absence of a consensus among EU Member States on common values does not have a 
positive impact on transition reforms in third countries, which find themselves moving 
towards a largely undefined target whose meaning is variously interpreted from case to case. 
The question is thus not about these values being ‘shared’ at some abstract level – for 
example both the EU Member States, Russia and Ukraine are signatories to the core Council 
of Europe conventions. The question is about who decides about the implementation of these 
values and how they receive their meaning. It is when conditionality is attached to these 
vague values that problems emerge.  
The abstraction of common values means that their specific meaning is decided in each 
case by whoever is empowered to implement those values and take the particular decision at 
that time. In the context of the ENP, the main issue is the lack, on the one hand, of an 
institutional framework enabling the neighbour countries to participate in decision-making 
about the actual meaning of common values and, on the other, of institutional and political 
                                                                                                                                                        
to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the 
subject.” Case of Handyside v the United Kingdom (1976) Series A No 24 at para 48, confirmed later in the 
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Member States, which, after all, are relatively homogenous. 
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(CIG 2/1/07 REV 1), available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>, last visited 05 November 2007. 
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means for promoting the concept of genuinely shared values between the EU and the 
neighbour countries. The ENP does not even provide the neighbour countries with the 
opportunity of being consulted during decision making. Instead, it is concerned primarily 
with the correct application of legal terminology and case law language by national courts 
and law enforcing agencies in the neighbour countries. This process poses the neighbour 
countries under constant legal and political influence of the EU institutions and political 
elites. In the last instance, it is the European Commission that sets the agenda for political 
reforms in the neighbour countries through its Country Reports. For example, the European 
Commission frequently links the enhancement of bilateral relations with a neighbour country 
with certain political reforms and concessions and proceeds to justify its own requests by the 
need to follow and implement the EU’s common values.72 Thus, instead of values serving as 
a neutral, mutually shared basis, they turn to politics – the politics of the European 
Commission in relation to the neighbour countries.  
The promotion of the EU’s common values under the ENP stands the chance of being 
successful only if they are positively received and supported domestically by people and 
political elites in the neighbour countries themselves. In this respect, the EU’s common 
values have note been uniformly received by the neighbour countries. Some countries have 
happily accepted the need to adopt and share the EU’s common values in order to enhance 
bilateral relations with the EU within the ENP. For example, the former Soviet ENP 
participants have repeatedly declared their adherence to the EU’s common values in the 
course of internal political, legal, and economic reforms. In particular, Ukraine has endorsed 
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its adherence to “European democratic values” even at the normative level.73 The 
governments of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijzan, and Moldova repeatedly emphasise the 
importance of sharing the EU’s common values in implementing further democratic reforms 
in their countries.
74
 
However, post-Soviet Russia has not unreservedly accepted the hegemony of the EU’s 
common values. In fact, the Western concept of human rights is considered by the Russian 
political and intellectual elite as a dubious concept, insofar as it is not only used to protect 
personal freedom, but also to impose and promote values which contradict the religious, 
national and traditional values of Russia. In response to the expansion of the EU’s common 
values, modern Russia has strived to develop an alternative set of values which should be 
shared by its former peers of the vanished Soviet Union. Political statements of the Russian 
government reiterate the need to  
keep own [emphasis added] values, not lose own achievements and support 
sustainability of the Russian democracy. We should find our own way [emphasis 
added] to the construction of a  democratic, free and justice society.
75
  
The Russian government does not hide its intention to compete with the EU in 
promoting its own values abroad. The Russian President V. Putin emphasises  
undoubtedly, the civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Eurasian 
continent must be continued. The objective [of the civilizing mission] is that 
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democratic values multiplied by national interests [emphasis added] enrich and 
strengthen our historical unity.
 76
  
Acknowledging that Russian foreign policy is based on principles of pragmatism, 
predictability and supremacy of international law, President Putin adds that “such values as 
strong ties of friendship, mutual help and reliance, comradeship and trust remain inviolable 
and immovable values on Russian soil for many centuries”. “Only our values [emphasis 
added] determine our aspiration to strengthening the statehood and sovereignty of Russia”.77 
At a closer look, the values invoked by President Putin display both similarities and 
differences with the universal set of human rights invoked by the EU. Putin reiterates that 
Russia shares and supports international legal standards and norms.
78
 At the same time, 
however,  Putin argues in favour of some room for “national, historical and cultural” 
interpretation of these principles. 
79
  
This is problematic for the EU, which has made quite a specific point about sharing its 
’universal’ values both with Russia80 and with the ENP countries. Somewhat paradoxically, 
the EU is now faced with the argument that Russia's common values are not the EU’s 
common values - or that the values perhaps are the same, but they are interpreted in quite 
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contradictory or particularist ways. As for the ENP countries, this argumentation places them 
rather uncomfortably in a position between two competing sets of common values and two 
competing universals. This also suggests that even though the language of ’common values’ 
is said to signify the end of the cold war and the disappearance of opposing camps through 
the victory of the Western liberal democratic market-oriented world-view, the language of 
common values is actually flexible enough to enable the continued existence of opposing 
camps. In fact, it might also be that the end of communism did not simply represent the 
lifting of the obstacle that was blocking the way to European unity; instead, it might come to 
mark the opening of a new era of exclusive nationalisms.
81
 When offering an alternative to 
the EU’s conception of universal values, common values also provide Russia with a 
welcomed counter-proposal to the conditionality attached to the EU’s reading of common 
values. 
However, this also leads us to of another question: even if it was shown that the 
common values the EU (or Russia) invokes were indeed “shared”, the legitimation for 
enforcing them does not automatically follow. The question thus seems to be: Under what 
conditions may the EU enforce ‘shared values’ and thus ‘represent’ the universal? On a 
theoretical level, the EU’s strategy aims at connecting the particular (the European, the 
Western) with the universal (the common values it invokes). Žižek argues that since the 
universal only exists at an abstract level and escapes definition, it is impossible to articulate it 
in any specific manner. The universal does not have a representative of its own, because there 
is no actor with an absolutely universal coverage. The universal is thus necessarily 
represented by a particular.
82
 The universal ‘shared values’ and the particular (the EU) never 
coincide completely; rather, the particular may come “to stand for the universal without 
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becoming identical with it”.83 However, the universal and the particular can never coincide 
completely.
84
  
Still, the EU presents itself as the ‘representative’ of that which is universally shared – 
after all, the universal is always rooted in and coloured by some particular content without 
having an independent substance.
85
 This situation is far from unique in world history: the EU 
is not the first to speak about universal values. But it would also not be the first case in which 
the reference to universal values would be used to cover the actor’s own particularist 
objectives.
86
 In our case at hand, this would be so if it appeared that the particular (the EU) 
used the language of ‘common values’ mainly in order to promote its own objectives. This 
would suggest that in referring to ‘common values’ the EU is, in fact, not representing that 
which is genuinely shared.  
For the ENP countries, the co-existence of two sets of universal values which are partly 
overlapping and partly different is difficult as they are put in a position where they are 
expected to choose between two competing interpretations of the universal. This 
demonstrates how, as Žižek argues, the universal is in fact always ‘empty’ and for this reason 
there is a constant on-going battle between various particulars over who should be entitled to 
define the contents of the universal.
87
 For the outsider, like the neighbours in our case, this 
creates a problem of needing to adjudicate between the various competing notions of 
universality.
88
 Butler’s suggests this can be solved by measuring how each particular 
manages to actualize its own political goals.
89
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This is because a political agenda is not necessarily wrong from the just because it is 
particular. On the contrary, the EU agenda may well include many worthy objectives. In our 
case, the EU’s agenda might ultimately be a positive framework for change if it coincides 
with the wishes of the people in the neighbour countries. The real challenge, therefore, is 
more of a political than of a legal nature. It consists of maintaining political control over the 
process at large by both the Union  and the ENP countries. Because ‘common values’ are 
open-ended, they offer a possibility for democratic contestation both on the side of the EU 
and that of the ENP states.
90
 This presumes the understanding of the ENP as mainly a 
political process. Politics is about resource allocation and about limiting the identity of 
Europe and adjusting to and managing these decisions. This will create Europe’s identity 
through politics and keep it open for further enlargement.  
 
5) Conclusion 
Recently, the notion of ‘common values’ has been frequently applied within internal 
and external dimensions of the EU activities as the EU’s universal values are being exported 
to third countries in the course of their internal democratic and market reforms. The EU 
societal model (Western, liberal market economy) is presented as the ‘final destination’ 
which other countries should be moving towards. To achieve these objectives some EU 
external policies, and the ENP in particular, are distinguished by the strong emphasis they 
place on the acceptance of the EU’s common values by third countries. However, there are 
several factors which may impede the effective adherence to the EU’s common values by 
third countries.  
The main question relates to the vagueness of these values: even within the EU itself, 
there is a lack of genuine European consensus on the content and scope of values, which the 
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EU Member States do share. Common values receive their meaning in the processes through 
which they are implemented. In the context of the ENP, the main problem is that the policy 
provide a moderate degree of the involvement of the neighbours’ representatives in 
discussion about the content and scope of ‘common values’ and about how these values 
should be implemented in practice. Consequently, these objectives risk representing certain 
political EU preferences instead of being a reflection of any genuinely ‘common values’. 
Notwithstanding the strong terms of conditionality of the ENP, the vagueness of the EU’s 
common values has transformed this concept, which is generally believed to be of a legal 
nature and thus objective and neutral, into a political instrument which the EU institutions 
can employ in order to influence the pace and direction of reforms in the neighbour countries. 
In the end, the policy of promoting the EU’s fundamental values under the label of 
‘common values’ without ensuring third countries’ national specifics and traditions are fully 
addressed and catered for undermines the credibility of the ENP policy of common value 
conditionality. As a result, this creates serious disadvantages for third countries. In order to 
rectify these shortcomings, a much more political understanding of ‘common values’ should 
be adopted by the EU. In disregarding the need for political debate about the meaning of 
values, EU policies also seem to be doing away with the need for political contestation and 
transformation of all the EU policy objectives through a democratic process within the 
neighbours themselves. In the case of the ENP, it is argued that there is much less need for 
fixed criteria and standards - in particular as they are unilaterally applied by the EU - than for 
dialogue. However, the mechanisms for implementing the ENP do not currently allow for 
dialogue, which is a matter in need of rectification.  
Finally, when a more political understanding of values is adopted, it becomes apparent 
that values as such do not guide policies nor are they capable of laying down the limits of 
Europe, since values receive their meaning through political debate. For this reason, values 
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will not close Europe’s borders in any permanent sense but keep them open for new members 
in the future. 
